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 The authors investigate the relationship between the institutional set up as de-
fined by the Constitution and the dynamics of democratic consolidation in Slova-
kia. The rule of parliamentary majority between 1994 and 1998 in Slovakia was 
characterized by unrestricted imposition of its will and its disrespect for institu-
tional limitations, which significantly jeopardized the position of parliamentary 
opposition and other constitutional actors. The outcome of this development was a 
regime of distorted parliamentarism which could not advance into a fully consoli-
dated democracy. The authors see the reason for this deficiency in the lack of ade-
quate stipulations in the Slovak Constitution by which an omnipotent parliamen-
tary majority could be checked. After the 1998 parliamentary elections and the 
retreat of Mečiar’s government, the new parliamentary majority proposed and 
partly adopted constitutional reforms in order to correct those deficits. The insti-
tutional changes need to be broadly accepted and practiced by all main political 
actors in order to function effectively. 
 
 Introduction 
 Among the factors that have impeded successful institutionalization of democracy in 
Slovakia, the constitutional rules established by the Slovak Constitution of 1992 have 
played a prominent role. Institutionalization, or similarly consolidation, of democracy 
was not completed, as Slovakia’s hurriedly drafted and vaguely formulated constitution 
did not successfully perform the goals expected from the institution of such significance 
since the independence of Slovakia. Therefore, the new government formed after the 
1998 elections put on its agenda a rather complex revision of the constitution, aimed at 
improving the provisions which belonged to the most contested issues in the past. How-
ever, two consequent amendments have not changed the general framework of the po-
litical system, i.e. that of parliamentary democracy. The institutionalization and per-
formance of a parliamentary democracy is our main interest, as this institutional ar-
rangement is the dominant form of government in Central and Eastern Europe, espe-
cially in those countries that have already applied for European Union membership. 
During the last decade several applicant countries have shifted toward this pattern, 
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though their constitutions may have originally provided for some forms of mixed types 
of government, semi-presidentialism, for example. 
 Obviously, this is not to claim that constitutions (as a specific form of the institu-
tion) as independent actors somehow miraculously marginalized political actors and 
predetermined the course of events. It is always agency (political actors) that makes and 
carries out individual and concrete decisions. However, political institutions matter in 
the sense that they provide agency with formative incentives that shape both the strate-
gies to be pursued and the goals to be achieved. In other words, what politicians do and 
how they do it is channelled through, and encouraged by, the existing institutional 
framework. Slovakia’s hastily drafted and adopted Constitution, and especially its 
vaguely formulated provisions specifying the division of powers, encouraged and made 
likely those objectives and actions that have not been conducive to the consolidation of 
democratic polity. We argue that to avoid these perils is a matter of a balanced interac-
tion between the clearly drafted constitutional rules and the complying political actors. 
In other words, we argue that a successful institutionalization of democracy requires 
congruent formal and informal institutions and rules. In Slovakia, the frequent clashes 
between the formal political rules (which demand an underlying political consensus), 
and the informal rules (which involve unrestrained majority rule) have hindered democ-
ratic consolidation.  
 We have divided our paper into three main parts. In the first section we clarify our 
understanding of the constitution as an institution and specify the relationship between 
the institutional set up and the consolidation of democracy. Next, we analyze the situa-
tion of Slovakia’s parliamentarism in the period between 1994 and 1998 and describe 
the way the strong and disciplined parliamentary majority brought about a “majori-
tarian” understanding of democracy. In the third part we look into the ways in which an 
omnipotent parliamentary majority can be checked. We also show that the Slovak con-
stitution neither established institutions capable of constraining the Parliament nor en-
dowed them with sufficient and unequivocal powers to do so. The last part reviews po-
litical and constitutional changes after the 1998 elections. 
 
 Democratic Consolidation and the Role of the Constitution 
 Most scholars studying the regime transition and democratic consolidation in the 
post-communist countries consider Slovakia a confusing case among the other East 
Central European countries. Even though after the electoral defeat of the Mečiar-led 
ruling coalition in the 1998 elections the new liberal, democratic and Western-oriented 
government of Mikuláš Dzurinda was formed, Slovakia is still classified among coun-
tries such as Albania, Belarus and Croatia (Ekiert 1999). Some analysts went even fur-
ther east and compared Slovakia (although positively) to Kazakhstan (Fish 1999). The 
political regime under Mečiar’s government was often labelled as either a non-liberal 
democracy (Zakaria 1997) or a nationalist-populist one (Carpenter 1997). The main rea-
son for this was the behaviour of the political elite during 1994-1998 – mainly the seri-
ous violations of democratic rules, including the exploitation of the secret service in po-
litical struggles, the cancellation of a deputy’s mandate, the installation of new Mem-
bers of Parliament, and the cancellation of the 1997 referendum on the topic of direct 
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presidential elections. All these actions either violated constitutional rules or were not in 
line with the decisions of the respective political institutions, which have the authority 
in these matters, such as the Constitutional Court and the Central Referendum Commis-
sion.  
 Within the mainstream democratization scholarship there have been different at-
tempts to explain the Slovak case. The first group of explanations links the problems of 
democratic consolidation to structural factors, such as the lower level of socio-economic 
development, the rather belated modernization and industrialization, the authoritarian 
political culture, etc. (Miháliková 1997). The second set of reasoning looks into the in-
stitutional design, including the executive-legislative relations, the electoral system, the 
shape of the parties and the party system (Malová 1998, Učeň 1999, Krause 2000). The 
third type of justification aims to account for Slovakia’s deficient democracy in terms of 
elite configuration (Szomolányi 1997).  
 However, the explanatory power of formal institutions during the process of transi-
tion from the authoritarian rule is limited. First, political actors are not impartial and 
they choose those institutions in which their particularistic interests and preferences are 
vested. Thus, political institutions, including constitutions, are more a result of immedi-
ate power relations than a source of power distribution; at that stage institutions do not 
shape the behaviour of political actors. Indeed, there are many proofs that a specific set 
of formal institutions does not automatically secure the survival of democracy. This is 
why we analyze the interaction of the formal and the informal rules during the institu-
tionalization of parliamentary democracy in Slovakia. We examine how the political 
elite has learned from the unbalanced set-up of political institutions and tried to improve 
the institutional arrangement to steer the political behaviour.  
 Together with Huntington, we understand institution as a “stable, valued, and recur-
ring pattern of behavior,” or at least as that kind of recurring behavioral pattern that as-
pires to become stable and valued. (Huntington 1968, 12) The actual process of acquisi-
tion of stability and value we call “institutionalization.” Thus, the notion of consolida-
tion of democracy approximates to the institutionalization of institutions encouraging 
democratic rules and procedures. Clearly, not every kind of institutionalization equals 
democratic consolidation, since the institutionalization of a non-democratic regime is 
also possible. Thus, the institution of a democratic constitution is to create a clearly bal-
anced division of powers between the bodies specified therein. Moreover, it is also to 
provide the fundamental principles upon which the autonomy of political, economic, 
civic and other domains can be based. 
 If institutions are the legal, administrative, and customary arrangements for repeated 
human interactions, their major function is the predictability of behavior. The prevailing 
institutional framework in a society consists of formal and informal rules, all of which 
carry their own incentives and transaction costs. Thus, an analysis of the efficiency of 
institutional changes has to establish the effects of changes in formal and informal rules 
on the incentives and transaction costs. The examples of formal rules are constitutions, 
statutes, common law, and other governmental regulations. They define the political 
system, the economic system and the protection system. One of the major common 
traits of formal rules is that they are externally enforced (North 1990; Pejovich 1995). 
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 The informal rules stem from the experiences – traditional values, religions, and all 
other factors that influence the subjective perceptions individuals form about the world 
in which they live. They are part of the heritage, which has passed the test of time. That 
is why the informal rules are referred to as the old ethos, the hand of the past or the car-
riers of history. The informal rules are often deeply rooted and widely shared; that is 
why these rules seem to be highly “institutionalized”. The informal rules change when 
ignored, through their erosion or replacement by formal rules. Evidence shows that 
similar formal rules imposed on different societies have produced different outcomes. 
 The drafting and establishing basic political rules and institutions should constitute a 
successful transition to procedural democracy, but it does not guarantee its stability and 
continuation. If the formal and informal rules are irreconcilable, the new democratic re-
gime may be endangered. Self-sustaining democracy also requires the creation of con-
sensus among the strategic elite over the democratic rules of political game and the re-
spect for democratic institutions.  
 From the ‘constitutional’ point of view, a major change occurred in the late 1980s / 
early 1990s in Eastern Europe – constitutions again started to matter. After decades of 
communism, when constitutions were largely formal and empty texts, the constitutions 
of transitional countries became legal expressions of newly acquired sovereignty and 
the documents establishing the rules of the political game. The same is true for the Slo-
vak Constitution of 1992. The constitution establishes the guiding principles regulating 
the rules and procedures through which actual policy outcomes are reached. Many con-
stitutional experts argue in favor of a clear separation of the ‘constitutional politics’ and 
the ‘everyday politics’. The former includes discussion about, fights over, and adoption 
of, the text of the constitution whose provisions constitute the solid grounds for every-
day political clashes. The adoption of constitutional provisions usually requires specific 
procedures (e.g. constitutional assemblies) and extraordinary majorities (e.g. two 
thirds). These are to safeguard an overall political consensus regarding the rules of the 
game. The position of the constitution in political struggles is a clear indicator of the 
degree of the ‘vertical dimension’ of democratic consolidation: “In case consolidation is 
strong (...) a spill-over is unlikely to occur from the disagreements about the rules to the 
disagreement about those second-order rules that are supposed to govern the conditions 
of our disagreement on the rules.” (Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998, 30) The ‘horizontal 
dimension’ of consolidation (ibidem) encompasses an indication of the degree to which 
economic, political, cultural and other sectors (domains, arenas) enjoy autonomy from 
each other. The higher the degree of autonomy, the more consolidated the given polity is.  
 
 Constitution as an Institution 
 In order for a social arrangement to be called ‘institution’, two conditions have to be 
fulfilled. First, institutions play a socializing role in that they prescribe desirable be-
havior. In other words, they restrict the modes of actions (negative part) and reward the 
preferable activities (positive part). Second, institutions do not only perform the role of 
“congruent socialization” (Offe 1996, 200) but should also function correctively, i.e. 
should be able to solve problems they were created to cope with. In short, institutions 
impose obligations upon actors and produce policy outcomes. Applied to the Slovak 
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Constitution, the constitutional provisions (concerning the division of powers) should 
clearly and unequivocally specify the ways political actors are expected to behave and 
deal with each other. In such a way the behavior complying to those rules is repeated 
and acquires stability. Moreover, any action not in line with the prescribed and repeated 
patterns will be considered deviant and not met with approval. At the same time, the be-
havior complying to the repeated and stable rules will better fit the need to generate the 
desired policy outcomes (the second characteristic of institution).  
 We argue that many articles of the Slovak constitution were not clearly specified. 
Hence the constitution, instead of being capable of solving political crises, itself became 
the source of political conflicts. A poorly crafted constitution cannot become the 
grounds for the consolidation of democracy (of which institutionalization is a prerequi-
site). The reason is threefold: First, disputable (and disputed) provisions are a source of 
conflicts among the actors whose roles are not clearly specified. Hence the “stability by 
repetition” is but a distant goal. Second, the capacity of distorted rules to generate desir-
able outcomes is largely limited. And third, the vague rules are themselves becoming 
the formative factor of actors’ behavior. Thus, not only do actors comply with (the un-
clear rules) as it was probably envisaged by the constitution drafters, but the rules them-
selves become the object of political squabbles.  
 
 Distorted Parliamentarism  
 Many provisions of the Slovak Constitution of 1992, including the stipulation of the 
separation of power are not clear and are open to different interpretation and conflicts 
over the rules. Also, the provisions on human rights are not supreme, as they can be 
further stipulated by the ordinary legislation and require only the majority vote (Bealey 
1995). According to the constitutional prerogatives, he Parliament – called the National 
Council of the Slovak Republic – is the strongest actor in the political arena. The Na-
tional Council enjoys many powers in establishing, replacing and suspending the ex-
ecutive and the judicial bodies and their incumbents. Therefore, the development of po-
litical process depends on the composition of the Parliament, the party discipline and 
cohesion, and the ruling elite’s understanding of democracy. 
 Slovakia’s development of the parliamentary system is a proof how difficult it is to 
maintain the separation of powers within the fused executive and legislative branches of 
government. We argue that the inner dilemma of a parliamentary democracy consists of 
two tasks. On the one hand, it is necessary to form a majority to back up the cabinet, 
and on the other, it is essential to preserve the constitutional checks on the executive. In 
Slovakia this problem has been ‘resolved’ in favor of the majority rule. The recent po-
litical practices have undermined the potential for resistance from offices and agencies, 
which might otherwise exert certain limiting pressures on the coalition in the legislature. 
Parliamentary systems in general have the fewest checks on the executive; therefore, if 
the disciplined majority parties emerge, this will likely promote a winner-takes-all ap-
proach. Usually, single-party majorities are not conducive to the survival of (parlia-
mentary) democracies, because the party can devise the political rules that foster its in-
terests and promote legislation that guarantees its own electoral victory, thereby under-
mining free and fair political competition. However, in Slovakia the ruling coalition be-
 
Malová, D., Rybář, M., The Troubled ..., Politička misao, Vol. XXXVII, (2000), No. 5, pp. 99–115 104 
                                                                                                                                              
fore the 1998 elections performed in most cases as a single-party cabinet. Only the di-
verging privatization interests caused some minor crises which were soon resolved.  
 After the 1994 elections the coalition of three parties (the Movement for a Democ-
ratic Slovakia – HZDS, the Workers’ Association of Slovakia – ZRS, the Slovak Na-
tional Party – SNS) managed to impose strong party discipline over their deputies. This 
influenced the performance of parliamentary democracy and the functioning of the 
separation of powers. This process began on November 3, 1994, at the opening session 
of the Parliament, and continued at the second session. During this night session the 
newly formed parliamentary majority, controlling 83 seats out of 150, managed to 
change the institutional set up of Slovakia’s parliamentary democracy by changing the 
statute laws and not following the previous informal customs to reserve some parlia-
mentary posts for the opposition. In one night, the parliamentary majority constituted 
the absolute majority rule, with very few checks on the executive and the constitutional 
constrains on the cabinet. In one night, the majority fully marginalized the opposition. 
Contrary to the traditional parliamentary practice, the majority voted against the oppo-
sition candidates for the vice-chairmanship of the Parliament; in addition, the opposition 
MPs were denied the chairmanship of any parliamentary committees. The opposition 
lost their seats in the supervisory bodies overseeing the mass media and the intelligence 
service. The opposition representatives were removed from the Supreme Auditing Of-
fice and the National Property Fund (FNM). Attorney General was also replaced. The 
majority also amended the Large Privatization Act and transferred the decision-making 
from the cabinet to the National Property Fund (FNM) controlled by HZDS1. Moreover, 
the parliamentary statistics of 1994-1998 period proved that the opposition could not 
even effectively participate in proposing the agenda of parliamentary sessions; the op-
position suggestions made for only 13 per cent of all proposals to the agenda2. 
 The country’s political discourse had dramatically changed in favor of a majoritarian 
interpretation of democracy. The political leaders of the ruling parties defended their 
distorting actions by apologetic rhetoric based on the principle of majority rule, assert-
ing that “after the elections you (the opposition) should get used to it (arbitrary and 
unlimited rule of majority)”3, or “democracy is the terror of the majority”4, or “the win-




1 It should be emphasized that the presumable authors of this ‘night scenario’, HZDS leaders Vladimír 
Mečiar and Ivan Gašparovič, who was elected as Chairman of the Parliament, did not vote for these bills; 
perhapse they were aware that many of them contradicted the Constitution. 
2 Chairman of Parliament is responsible for setting the agenda; however, individual MPs have a right to 
propose additions to the agenda. These proposals have to be passed by the majority of Parliament. 
3 Vladimír Mečiar, HZDS Chairman, at the first session of the Parliament.  
4 Daily Sme cited Eva Zelenayova, HZDS MP. Sme, June 7, 1995. 
5 Daily Pravda cited Vitazoslav Móric, MP of the Slovak National Party. Pravda, February 7, 1997. 
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 Limiting Parliamentary Omnipotence 
 The need for a clearly and carefully drafted constitution increases in countries where 
there is an unsettled elite, lacking underlying procedural and cultural consensus. Espe-
cially critical for the consolidation of democracy are the rules on the separation of pow-
ers and the system of check and balances (Holmes, 1993; Zielonka, 1994). There are at 
least four possible ways a Parliament with a strong and disciplined majority can be 
checked. These include an upper chamber constituted on a different principle than the 
lower chamber; referendums in which citizens can decide about relevant and important 
political issues; the Constitutional Court effectively preserving country’s constitution; 
and a president who can stand as a barrier with more than the formal power to veto the 
legislation adopted in the parliament.  
 Even though in 1992 there were some signs that the Slovak deputies from the Fed-
eral Assembly (who voted for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, effective from January 
1, 1993) would be placed in an upper chamber of the Slovak Parliament, the decision 
that the National Council would remain a unicameral body was adopted. 
 A referendum offers a possible tool that may serve as an additional check on the 
fused executive-legislative power. However, this element of direct democracy has been 
often misused and, therefore discredited by autocratic regimes in the 20th century. In 
the new democracies it may assist to both the development and the breakdown of fragile 
regimes. While the opposition may mobilize population by organizing petitions and 
prevent the expansion of rising autocratic forces, the autocratic government can also 
confirm itself and prolong its power (see Butler and Ranney, 1994, pp. 181-183). The 
Slovak Constitution rather carefully divided rights of the organization of referendums 
between the executive and legislative branches of power. Article 95 states that referen-
dum “shall be announced by the President of the Slovak Republic upon a petition sub-
mitted by no less than 350,000 citizens, or upon a resolution of the National Council of 
the Slovak Republic.” However, the main problem of the referendum as specified in the 
Slovak Constitution is the fact that its effects are confusing. The Constitution remains 
unclear regarding the consequences of a referendum’s results. The Constitutional Court, 
clearly under strong pressures from both the opposition and the coalition forces, ruled 
that the result of a referendum does not automatically become a legislative norm. At the 
same time, it is binding for the parliamentarians, who are to adopt legislations in accor-
dance with the “will of the people.” However, there is no way deputies can be legally 
forced to comply with the results of a referendum since the Slovak constitution states 
that they are not bound by any directives. Hence, a referendum in Slovakia does not per-
form the role of a check upon the legislature. Moreover, the confused constitutional 
provisions regulating a referendum’s outcomes may be indirectly held responsible for 
the circumstances leading to the thwarted referendum on the direct presidential election 
and the NATO membership in 1997. 
 The Constitutional Court in the Slovak Republic was established in March 1993. 
The President, who chose from 20 candidates nominated by the Parliament, appointed 
ten Justices to a seven-year term. The Court may examine the constitutionality of any 
law, statute, or regulation passed by the Parliament, the Cabinet of Ministers, or local 
government without the need for an actual lawsuit. However, the Court does not have 
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the power of an a priori constitutional review, which could stop unconstitutional laws 
before they can be implemented.6 
 The enforcement of the Court’s decisions is to a certain extent “soft”. When the 
Court finds any contradictions in laws, these rules, parts or clauses thereof shall become 
ineffective. The authorities that passed these rules shall bring them to conform with the 
Constitution not later than six months following the finding of the Constitutional Court. 
After this period these rules become ineffective. The former cabinet efficiently used this 
broad provision with respect to privatization and this also contributed to the legal com-
plications in the “Gaulieder case”. Gaulieder, a HZDS deputy decided to leave his par-
liamentary party club and stay in the parliament as an ‘independent’ MP. However, be-
fore the elections of 1994 he (and many of his colleagues from HZDS) signed a letter 
(undated) in which he resigned from his parliamentary seat. The purpose of this was to 
discipline future HZDS deputies and not to allow them to leave the party. After 
Gaulieder quit the HZDS faction, the letter appeared in the Parliament as if it was sent 
by the deputy. The parliamentary majority simply “accepted” his “resignation,” even 
though Gaulieder several times proclaimed the he had not given up his mandate. The 
Constitutional Court later ruled that Gaulieder’s constitutional rights were infringed; 
however, the Constitution did not provide the Court with the power to cancel the Par-
liament’s decision. The Court only appealed to the legislature to reconsider its decision. 
The case pointed to a previously unnoticed flaw in the Constitution – it does not contain 
a mechanism by which a basic individual constitutional right can be enforced. 
 The government had also contested the powers of the Constitutional Court, its deci-
sions, and its role in the political life, since the Court was the last institutional barrier 
that could be used by the opposition. The Mečiar-led HZDS and the leaders of the Slo-
vak National Party often criticized the Court as a biased institution that backs the oppo-
sition. For example, in 1995 the Cabinet withdrew some financial support for the Court 
Chairman, trying to punish him for the Court’s independence. Moreover, a HZDS 
Member of the Parliament proposed to amend the Court’s decision-making procedure, 
which would replace the majority voting by the qualified majority, requiring seven 
votes.  
 Presidential competencies have probably been the most controversial issue of the 
Constitution. President was weak in comparison with the Parliament and could be made 
politically accountable to the Parliament. His right to dissolve the Parliament was un-
productive, because it did not constitute a real threat to the parliamentarians. The presi-
dent could dissolve the legislature only in one case, if it failed three times within six 
months after the elections to form a cabinet. In the period of six months after the general 
elections the president did not have a chance to play any role in possible parliamentary 
crises. The president was defined as a part of the executive branch of power, within 
which he might enjoy a relatively strong influence, since he might preside over cabinet 
meetings and require reports from ministers. Increasing the incongruity of presidential 
 
6 For example, the constitutional amendment of the Act on privatization passed in November 1994 
allowed to privatize a huge part of the national property by new owners, before the Court ruled on the 
unconstitutionality of this amendment. The government continued to apply this law for the next six months, as 
is stipulated by the Constitution. 
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powers, the provisions defining the rights to appoint and recall the prime minister, the 
members of the cabinet and some other administrative bodies were not clear.7 More-
over, the presidential veto power was submitted to the prime minister, because the 
president had to return laws on the prime minister’s request. This paved the way for in-
stitutional competition and conflicts within the branches of the power. Finally, the de-
sign of this component of power was made even more complicated by confusing the 
provisions regulating presidential elections.  
 To get a president elected, MPs had to muster a three-fifth majority, i.e. to find a 
candidate who received at least 90 of all 150 votes. If any of the candidates did not re-
ceive such a majority in the first round, the two candidates who received the most votes 
were scheduled for the second round. However, the number of the required votes was 
not decreased in the second round, and the third one was not foreseen at all. According 
to the Constitution, the candidates who did not get enough votes were simply eliminated 
from the race, and the subsequent rounds of the presidential elections should start with 
entirely new candidates. The procedure implied the danger that a president was not 
elected and thus, institutional structure established by the Constitution was incomplete. 
The danger of a vacant president’s position indeed came about and Slovakia did not 
have a head of state between March 1998 and May 1999. In addition, in case no presi-
dent was in office, the Constitution did not transfer all presidential powers to the prime 
minister and some of them were not allocated to any institution, including the powers of 
dissolving the Parliament, promulgating laws, and appointing the prime minister, cabi-
net ministers, and other principal officials. The opposition feared that this situation 
could evolve into a constitutional crisis, because the Constitution did not provide the 
rules for the cabinet’s resignation after the general elections scheduled for September 
1998. The constitution stipulated that the prime minister must submit his resignation to 
the president. It was unclear how a prime minister can be removed from office if there 
was no head of state to which their resignation could be submitted. This was solved 
only in July 1998, after long political controversies, when Mečiar-led political forces 
made concessions, and the Parliament passed an amendment to the Constitution which 
transferred all the above mentioned powers, including the competence to accept the 
resignation of the incumbent cabinet to the chairman of the Parliament in the case of a 
vacant presidential seat.  
 The presidential veto power, a possible check on the legislature, was also ineffec-
tive. Though the president may ask the National Council to reconsider a law it has 
adopted, the National Council may override this veto by a simple majority. This provi-
sion was too far from democratic parliamentary traditions, which usually require a 
higher majority to overrule the vetoed laws. Since the opposition could not block de-
structive legislation in Parliament, President Kováč was forced to use his veto power, 
and this tool, usually rarely used in stable democracies, became a part and parcel of the 
 
7 Mečiar-led Cabinet used these constitutional ambiguities and shifted some powers of the president to the 
cabinet. In April 1995, the Parliament passed an amendment to the law on the Slovak Intelligence Service 
(SIS), according to which the President lost the right to name and recall the Head of the SIS. In July 1995, the 
Parliament approved a cabinet bill transferring from the President to the Cabinet the power to name the Chief 
of General Staff of the Slovak Army. Formerly, the Chief of General Staff was nominated by the Defense 
Minister and approved (or rejected) by the President. 
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legislative process in Slovakia. However, it had almost no impact on the quality of leg-
islative norms. The frustrated opposition and the President could appeal to the Constitu-
tional Court as the last available institution that could stop destructive consequences of 
the unlimited majority rule. 
 The Constitution did not stipulate the formal rules of the selection of prime ministers 
and the formation of cabinets; it states that the president shall, on the advice of the 
prime minister, appoint and recall cabinet members. However, another article of the 
Constitution states that the Prime Minister might also present a motion for the dismissal 
of a member of the Government. These two articles led to a conflict between the Presi-
dent and Prime Minister in 1993, when Mečiar began dismissing ministers who resisted 
him. President Kováč petitioned the Constitutional Court to decide this issue. The Court 
ruled that only the president has the power to appoint or dismiss ministers, while the 
Prime Minister may propose dismissals and appointments to the president.  
 This decision, which introduced an element of semi-presidentialism into Slovakia’s 
parliamentary system, started serious controversies between President Kováč and Prime 
Minister Mečiar. It was even increased in March 1994, when President’s report on the 
state of the Slovak Republic pushed hesitant MPs to dismiss the Prime Minister. The 
political conflicts between these two leaders grew and peaked in September 1995, when 
President’s son was abducted.  
 Another constitutional provision states that a president might be dismissed by the 
Parliament by a 3/5 qualified majority if they act contrary to the sovereignty or the ter-
ritorial integrity of the country or its constitutional and democratic system. We know of 
no democratic parliamentary system with a similar provision. Moreover, it sets up the 
possibility for the emergence of the so-called negative coalitions, which are able to 
reach a consensus if they want to dismiss a president, but are not able to elect a new 
one.8 The HZDS-led Cabinet and parliamentary coalition tried to discredit the president 
and launched a negative campaign in the government-controlled mass media. However, 
the government did not have support of the required three-fifths majority in the Parlia-
ment to dismiss Kováč. As we have suggested in the first part of the paper, a party tak-
ing part in the conflict over powers not well settled in the constitution is prone to use 
almost any means available to shift the balance in its favor. In the case of the conflict 
over presidential powers, the parliamentary majority (short of a majority necessary to 
amend the constitution) first circumscribed president’s powers by changing the ordinary 
(statutory) laws specifying the competencies of the head of state. Later, the same par-
liamentary majority expressed an extra-constitutional “vote of no confidence” to the 
president, a procedure not specified in the Constitution and thus without any legal im-
plications. Eventually, the attacks against the President and his family (abduction of his 
son) displayed clear signs of the Slovak Intelligence Service’s involvement. The organi-
zation was at that time controlled exclusively by the deputies from the aforementioned 
parliamentary majority. 
 
8 In parliamentary democracies such situations usually can occur only with respect to the dismissal of 
prime ministers. Thus, to avoid a destabilization of the political system, the German constitution stipulates the 
so-called constructive vote of confidence. 
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 Political and Constitutional Changes after the 1998 Elections 
 The second general elections since independence were scheduled for September 
1998. Four months before, the parliament passed a number of amendments to the elec-
toral law, initiated by the HZDS and the SNS parliamentary parties, designed to reduce 
the strength of the opposition parties. The electoral alliances, which these had formed 
were in effect rendered useless, as the new provisions of the law stated that each party 
in any alliance would have to pass the five percent threshold in order to be allocated 
seats. This was directed against an alliance of five small parties, the Slovak Democratic 
Coalition (SDK), two of which could not expect to get the required five per cent of the 
votes; it was directed also against the three small Hungarian parties brought together 
under the label ‘Hungarian Coalition’. These two alliances had therefore to merge into 
two parties, which required difficult and lengthy negotiations during the election campaign. 
 In addition to the newly founded SDK and the Hungarian party (MK), a new catch-
all populist party was formed under the name of the Party of Civic Understanding 
(SOP), which looked for support among the left-inclined voters of Eastern Slovakia as 
well as among the disillusioned HZDS voters. Rudolf Schuster, the charismatic and 
populist mayor of Košice, a moderate nationalist in favor of EU membership, became 
the leader of that party. Together with the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), these 
three new opposition parties met prior to the election to discuss their campaign strate-
gies as well as the possible post-election coalition arrangements. 
 In the event, the four opposition parties did win the election with 58 percent of the 
votes and obtained 93 of the 150 seats in the parliament. Mikuláš Dzurinda, the leader 
of the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), formed the government. With 62 percent of 
the seats and 93 MPs, the four-party government had a comfortable majority in the par-
liament, the majority which allows even for a change of the constitution. 
 In November of 1998, Prime Minister Mikulaš Dzurinda submitted his program to 
the parliament. The program envisaged significant political and economic changes, in-
cluding the restructuring and privatization of banks with the help of foreign investors. 
Though the new government is hardly to blame for Slovakia’s current economic woes, 
the failure to turn the economy around may result in a resurgence of popularity for the 
former government. Including PHC in the coalition provoked outrage among the other 
governing parties, since PHC is widely seen as a threat to Slovak interests. Defending 
the decision to include PHC, the prime minister remarked that it had proven itself to be 
a major democratic force in Slovakian politics. He also pointed out that the country 
needed “peace and good relations with its neighbors” and that these objectives could be 
accomplished only if all the parties that supported such goals were represented in the 
cabinet. In addition, Dzurinda argued that the improvement of the Hungarian-Slovakian 
relations would be “an important element” of the new government’s policies.  
 The newly formed ruling coalition also tried to include two opposition parties, 
HZDS and SNS into the parliamentary leadership and offered them two posts of Vice-
Chair and chairmanship in a parliamentary committee. This was an attempt to overcome 
the adversarial mode of political competition, which was typical for the country since 
the collapse of the communist regime. However, while SNS accepted this proposal and 
nominated its deputy to the Vice-Chair position, HZDS used this opportunity to go on 
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with its previous mode of political behavior and blamed the ruling coalition that the of-
fered positions were not really important and the party’s leaders demanded different 
posts, such as chairing the special supervisory committee for the control of the secret 
service. The ruling parties rejected these demands as unsustainable in a parliamentary 
democracy, mainly because of the previous abuse of the secret service by the HZDS 
leaders. 
 Once formed, and with the parliament’s approval, the government set about to re-
solve the problems inherited from the Mečiar regime. Most importantly, Slovakia had 
been without a president since the expiration of Kováč’s term, on March 2, 1998. In 
January 1999, after several months of debating various proposals, the leading politicians 
of the parties that made up the ruling coalition amended the Constitution. Even though 
Slovakia will remain a parliamentary democracy, the president now will be directly 
elected by popular vote. Most opposition HZDS deputies did not take part in the vote, 
although they were present. The Constitution’s new text provides carefully laid out 
electoral procedure, with a view to avoiding manipulation. The amendment also rede-
fined the scope of presidential powers, in an attempt to square them with the principles 
of parliamentary democracy. The office of the president lost certain prerogatives but 
gained others. For example, the president lost the power to preside over cabinet meet-
ings and to take part in parliamentary meetings without an invitation from the deputies. 
The only parliamentary appearance offered the president under the amended Constitu-
tion, is the “state of the union” address. Also, presidents may no longer veto “constitu-
tional laws” (laws passed by a three-fifths majority in parliament) and are able to de-
clare amnesty and exercise prerogatives as commanders-in-chief only with the counter-
signature of the minister of justice and prime minister. This was clearly a response to 
the controversial amnesties granted by Mečiar after he had assumed some presidential 
powers. In addition, the president will no longer be able to intervene in the formation of 
a government, which he had been authorized to do according to a controversial decision 
of the Constitutional Court issued in 1993.  
 On the other hand, the president’s power to dissolve the parliament – in the event of 
a conflict between the legislative and executive branches – was broadened. According 
to the former provisions (Art. 102), the president “may dissolve the National Council of 
the Slovak Republic if the policy statement of the government of the Slovak Republic is 
not approved three times within six months after the elections.” According to the new 
text, which replaced the original provisions of Art. 102, the president may dissolve par-
liament if, after a no-confidence vote, deputies fail to elect a new government on three 
separate occasions; if the parliament does not pass a government-supported bill that has 
been linked to a no-confidence vote; or if the parliament fails to pass any laws within a 
three-month period (an indication that the chamber lacks a working majority). However, 
the president cannot exercise this power during the last six months of the parliament’s term.  
 The amendment also provides for impeachment, a somewhat unusual provision in a 
parliamentary system. Under the previous Art. 106, the parliament may “recall the 
president from his post if the president is engaged in activity directed against the sover-
eignty and the territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic or in the activity aimed at 
eliminating the Slovak Republic’s democratic constitutional system.” In such cases, the 
motion to recall the president had to be submitted by more than one-half of all the 
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deputies, and the impeachment was valid if supported by at least a three-fifth majority 
of all deputies. The new amendment renders the president’s removal somewhat more 
difficult than it was previously. First, a three-fifth majority must pass a resolution or-
dering that the issue of impeachment be brought to the electorate. Then a popular vote 
must be held, and the president is impeached if the resolution is supported by the ma-
jority of voters. Should the president survive the impeachment vote, he is entitled to 
dismiss the parliament and, at that moment, he begins to serve a new five-year term. 
Another minor change introduced by the amendment is that, in the future, the presi-
dent’s constitutional oath will be administered by the chair of the Constitutional Court 
rather than by the chair of the parliament. Also, if the president decides to resign, he 
must submit his resignation to the chair of the Constitutional Court. 
 It was agreed that the election should take place rapidly, since Slovakia had been 
without a head of State for a long time. Prime Minister Dzurinda and his coalition part-
ners asked Rudolf Schuster, the chairman of the governing SOP, to stand for the elec-
tions. Former Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar decided to run, as well. At the first bal-
lot, Schuster obtained 47 per cent of the vote and Mečiar 37 percent; none of the other 
eight candidates scored ten percent. Schuster was then elected president at the second 
ballot with 57 percent of the votes: the governing coalition had retained strong popular 
support. Thus, Slovakia’s political system was again completed.  
 However, the ruling coalition has faced several obstacles, which hinders an effective 
performance of parliamentarism. First and foremost, by its nature, the ruling coalition is 
very diverse, and consists of several political forces, which have different political pref-
erences, alliances and programs. Coalition governments, with a large number of parties 
tend to enlarge the scope of representation and fever interests are excluded from access 
to decision-making. With an increasing number of actors and policy dimensions, how-
ever, efforts to build viable majorities and to agree on durable, binding policy decisions 
may decline, provided the parties do not agree on techniques of consensus building. 
Therefore, the Slovak public tends to perceive the post-election development as an on-
going ‘crisis’, since the coalition political parties usually have different opinions on the 
governmental policies. Thus several reforms have been delayed, because of frequent 
disagreements. In such situations, the Coalition Council, a political body set up by the 
ruling parties and chaired by the party leaders has played the crucial role in consensus 
building. However, this political institution does not have constitutional legitimation, 
the fact frequently criticized by the opposition, although the same body used to resolve 
some political and policy controversies in the past. Further, this mode of decision-mak-
ing, which requires concessions of all partners, is time-consuming and does not fit into 
the popular demands and the dominant political culture. Voters expect fast, simple and 
beneficial decisions, which the current government cannot produce mainly due to the 
structural and the socio-economic reasons and many divergent interests and demands on 
the government.  
 Moreover, the opposition has already used a referendum to undermine the stability 
of the ruling coalition. The first petition asking for a referendum was connected with the 
Law on the use of minority languages, and the second was related to early elections. 
The first referendum initiative involved a serious obstacle, as the constitution forbids 
referenda on human rights questions, and this one would include language issues. Presi-
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dent Rudolf Schuster decided to set up teams of legal experts to advise him on this is-
sue. In the end, Schuster decided against calling a referendum, supporting this decision 
by legal expertise and international aspects, as such referendum could again injure Slo-
vakia’s international credibility. 
 The second referendum on early elections indeed took place in November 2000, in 
spite of several arguments that it was not possible to have such question decided by a 
popular plebiscite. The referendum was not valid – the same pattern was repeated as in 
all referendums that were organized in Slovakia – because of the low turnout. At least 
50 percent of registered voters must participate in a referendum to be valid. 
 Dzurinda’s cabinet has focused on those reforms that are part and parcel of the EU 
accession process. In February 2001, the parliament adopted the second significant 
amendment to the Constitution, considered necessary for improving several contradic-
tions in the Basic Law. The amendments, together with the reform of the public-service 
sector, is a key prerequisite for EU accession and would bring Slovakia’s Constitution 
in line with EU standards. The parliamentary Commission for Constitutional Change 
was formed in the spring of 1999 and consisted of four deputies from the ruling coali-
tion who are also their parties’ constitutional-law experts. Despite the ruling coalition’s 
offer, the opposition parties refused to participate in the commission’s work. Although 
the amendments had been ready since March 2000, several controversial issues between 
the coalition parties had to be resolved before the parliament could begin to debate. The 
opposition deputies of Vladimír Mečiar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (MDS) 
voted against the legislation en masse, and called February 23 an ‘ominous day for Slo-
vakia’, but did not succeed in mobilizing a single person to join their protest in front of 
the parliament against the amendments.  
 The other amendment specifies the procedure whereby a deputy may resign from the 
parliament. (That clarity on this issue is necessary became apparent during the infamous 
Gaulieder case when a fake letter purportedly sent by Deputy František Gaulieder to the 
parliament’s Mandate Committee served as a pretext for the committee to strip him of 
his mandate).  
 The amendments also ushered in changes in the judicial system. The number of 
Constitutional Court justices was increased from 10 to 13 and their terms were extended 
from 7 to 12 years. Another amendment remedied provisions regarding referenda, al-
lowing the president to petition the Constitutional Court over a referendum’s constitu-
tionality before it is announced to the public. This proposal came at the request of 
President Rudolf Schuster. The amendments also established a new institution, the Judi-
cial Council, in an effort to strengthen the judiciary. The amendments also established 
the office of ombudsman. Moreover, articles regulating the competence of the Supreme 
Auditing Office were substantially amended, and its powers over budgetary spending 
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 Conclusion 
 We believe that controversial, inconsistent, and unclear constitutional provisions af-
ter the establishment of Slovakia have worked as the driving force generating formative 
incentives for actors’ goals and strategies. The disciplined parliamentary majority dur-
ing that period was not effectively checked and limited by any bodies (with a partial ex-
ception of the Constitutional Court). Unclear provisions concerning referendums were 
misused to thwart the plebiscite in 1997. Presidential veto was unproductive, while 
some other articles regarding presidential powers became the generator of further con-
flicts between the president and the parliamentary majority controlled by the cabinet. 
Even though the role of the Constitutional Court has been largely positive, some of its 
rulings caused even more confusion.  
 Although the brief examination of the constitutional amendments has illustrated that 
the political elite has been learning fundamental ‘rules of the game’ under the frame-
work of parliamentary democracy, even this improvement of formal rules cannot over-
come the deep rift in the political elite in Slovakia, which continues to be shaped by a 
sharp mode of party competition between the nationalist and the liberal block. To an-
chor informal rules of consensus democracy in such a deeply divided polity has been a 
very complicated process, as only one political block – the liberal – accepts the existing 
formal rules of parliamentary democracy, while the nationalist forces continue to favor 
the majority rule and the populist appeals and instruments. 
 We suppose that the examined constitutional and other institutional changes point to 
the right direction; however, to function effectively, these formal rules have to be 
broadly accepted and practiced by all main political actors. Only in this way it is possi-
ble to build and sustain a coherent institutional framework, in which the informal rules 
support the formal ones. Such a development may also help to overcome a strong ten-
dency to majority rule that can be interpreted as the communist legacy – the legacy of 
an authoritarian regime. In such a way a “congruent socialization” of political actors 
toward consensual democracy may also gradually develop. Whether it is possible also to 
“socialize” the nationalist and the populist political actors or a gradual marginalization 
will be an option, will be resolved only in the next general elections. 
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